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CONSUMER-FINANCE MYTHS AND OTHER OBSTACLES TO 
FINANCIAL LITERACY 
WILLIAM R. EMMONS* 
The consumer-finance market for middle and upper-income households in 
the United States is characterized by a wide range of choices, both in terms of 
financial-services providers and the specific products and services available.1  
Prices generally are determined in competitive markets.  Consumer-protection 
regulation is extensive.  Why then is there so much dissatisfaction with the 
U.S. consumer-finance market, even for prime-quality customers? 
This paper focuses not on inadequate choices, inadequate competition or 
regulation, but on the difficulty many middle and upper-income households 
encounter in making good financial decisions—that is, a low average level of 
financial literacy.  Millions of households are unable to make wise financial 
decisions even when adequate information is available.  Low levels of 
financial skills provide a fertile environment for consumer-finance myths to 
arise and gain widespread acceptance. 
The first section of this paper describes some basic financial decision-
making skills and their prevalence in the general population.  The purpose of 
this section is to demonstrate how low the level of basic financial literacy is in 
the United States.  The discussion in this section is based on a large nationwide 
survey of households regarding their actual financial behaviors and their use of 
various financial products.  The second section of the paper discusses more 
complex financial concepts needed to see through some of the most common 
consumer-finance myths. 
The third section of the paper explores seven consumer-finance myths—
beliefs, rules of thumb, or marketing pitches that are misleading or untrue.  The 
myths I discuss generally fall into three categories, relating to interest rates, the 
risks of borrowing, and the home ownership decision.  The first two consumer-
finance myths persist because of an inadequate understanding of interest rates.  
The third and fourth myths stem from a poor understanding of debt contracts.  
 
* The author is a Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  This paper was 
presented at the Saint Louis University School of Law conference, “Consequences of the 
Consumer Lending Revolution.”  The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System. 
 1. There are many other problems that are unique to low-income households in the 
consumer-finance market.  This paper does not address those difficulties specifically. 
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Myths number five and six are perpetuated because the financial implications 
of home ownership are complicated.  The seventh consumer-finance myth 
afflicts not just consumers but also those scholars, policy-makers, regulators, 
and consumer advocates who believe that just a little more time, money, 
education, or financial-literacy training will create a financially literate 
population once and for all. 
The paper’s fourth section discusses obstacles to attaining widespread 
financial literacy.  For those who are not financially savvy now—that is to say, 
most of the population—the perpetuation of these myths is especially likely.  
The final section concludes. 
I.  BASIC FINANCIAL LITERACY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Consumers must make many financial decisions, from the most basic cash-
flow management to complex investment choices and retirement planning.  It 
would not be surprising if a large number of people find complex financial 
decision-making difficult.  However, existing evidence suggests that even 
basic financial literacy is by no means common among U.S. households.  Some 
types of basic consumer financial decision-making are more problematic than 
others. 
What does one need to do or know to be financially literate?  At a 
minimum, consumers must be able to keep track of their cash resources and all 
payment obligations, know how to open an account for saving and how to 
apply for a loan, and have a basic understanding of health and life insurance.  
A financially savvy consumer compares competing offers and can plan for 
future financial needs such as buying a house, sending a child to college, and 
retirement. 
Unfortunately, financial knowledge is in short supply.  A survey conducted 
in 2002 by the JumpStart Coalition found that 12th graders could correctly 
answer only 50% of the questions on a basic financial-skills quiz.2  Adults 
sometimes do better on tests like this, but still show gaps in their financial 
knowledge as well as in their actual financial behaviors.  The lack of basic 
financial knowledge correlates with poor financial management, including 
such behaviors as using payday lenders or check-cashing services, incurring 
late fees on credit cards, failing to maintain precautionary savings balances, 
passing up employer matching contributions to retirement accounts, and being 
chronically under-insured. 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize a recent study of adult consumers’ financial 
behaviors and their use of basic financial products.3  A study of specific 
 
 2. Marianne A. Hilgert et al., Household Financial Management: The Connection between 
Knowledge and Behavior, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 309, 311 (2003). 
 3. Id. at 309-22; See also Sandra Braunstein & Carolyn Welch, Financial Literacy: An 
Overview of Practice, Research, and Policy, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 445, 453-55 (2002). 
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financial behaviors is likely to be more informative and reliable than a study of 
financial knowledge because knowledge alone does not guarantee that 
households will act wisely when making actual financial decisions.  After all, 
some (much?) financial advertising is designed to confuse consumers or 
reinforce bad habits (for example, impulse shopping), inhibiting the translation 
of knowledge into action. 
The survey questions were asked as part of the November and December 
2001 waves of the University of Michigan Survey Research Center’s monthly 
“Surveys of Consumers.”4  This survey has been conducted monthly since 
1940 and occasionally contains special questions to investigate topics such as 
household financial management.  The sample included 1,004 randomly 
selected households from across the country.  Interviews were conducted by 
telephone. 
Table 1 summarizes the percentage of the sampled households that 
reported engaging in specific financial behaviors that typically are associated 
with basic financial literacy.  The sample households were not told that 
financial literacy was being investigated.  The four main consumer-finance 
categories included cash-flow management, savings, investment, and credit 
management. 
One general conclusion that can be drawn from Table 1 is that U.S. 
households do not consistently demonstrate the basic skills of financial 
literacy.  To be sure, some households are very savvy financially, but the 
overall picture is of a mediocre level of financial literacy.  Of the eighteen 
specific financial behaviors listed in the table, a majority of the sampled 
households did not demonstrate that behavior in eleven cases—that is, for most 
of the behaviors investigated (eleven out of eighteen), a majority of households 
did not demonstrate them.  Another way to say this is that the median (or 
typical) percentage of households demonstrating one of the desirable financial 
behaviors was only 47.5%. 
Among the various types of financial behaviors summarized in Table 1, the 
highest average level of financial skill was in cash-flow management.  A clear 
majority of households reported that they had a checking account, paid bills on 
time, kept financial records, and balanced their checkbooks monthly.  (No 
attempt was made to verify if households’ responses to these or any other 
questions were accurate.)  The lowest level of financial literacy was in the area 
of investment—perhaps not surprising given the complexity of the task, as well 
as the inherent “avoidability” of learning about or making investment 
decisions.  A bare majority of sampled households practiced diversification 
across investment categories, and only a third or fewer participated in some 
 
 4. General information about the survey can be accessed at the University of Michigan 
Survey of Consumers web page, available at http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu (last visited April 18, 
2005). 
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kind of retirement investment plan (not counting Social Security, which is 
involuntary). 
Credit appears to be reasonably well managed according to the survey 
results—at least compared to the other types of consumer-finance tasks.  
However, the act of “reviewing credit report,” which is done by 58% of 
households, may not be as important for financial well-being as paying credit-
card bills on time to avoid finance charges (49%) or comparing credit-card 
offers (35%).  Moreover, various data sources suggest that a significantly 
larger number of households actually may run balances on their credit cards 
than admit doing so in surveys.5 
Thus, it is safe to say that a clear majority of U.S. households with credit 
cards do not shop around when applying for a card and end up paying finance 
charges on the cards they use.  These facts alone might support the conclusion 
that credit management is poor in the average U.S. household.  Another 
indication of poor credit management is the fact (not shown in the table) that 
virtually all households that are paying high rates of interest on credit-card 
balances simultaneously hold balances in low-yielding assets, such as checking 
or savings deposits or money-market mutual funds, or have housing equity 
against which they could borrow at a lower rate.6  These balances sometimes 
are substantial and could be used to pay down or eliminate credit-card 
balances, resulting in meaningful savings to the household.  Perhaps the 
clearest evidence of U.S. households’ poor credit-management skills is the 
more than 13 million non-business bankruptcy filings in the United States 
 
 5. Only 44.4% of households reported running a balance on credit cards in the Federal 
Reserve’s 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, with a median reported value of $1,900.  See Ana 
M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence From the 1998 and 2001 
Survey of Consumer Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 23 (2003).  Meanwhile, banks and other 
financial institutions reported an average of $722.3 billion of outstanding revolving lines of 
consumer credit (mostly credit cards) during 2001.  If only 44.4% of the approximately 108 
million households at that time had outstanding balances, then the average balance would be 
$15,630, or almost eight times the median reported by consumers.  One plausible explanation for 
the discrepancy is that a larger fraction of households actually had outstanding balances than said 
they did in the survey.  See Statistical Release, U.S. Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Statistical 
Release G.19: Consumer Credit, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/ 
default.htm (Mar. 7, 2005). 
 6. For example, 33% of households that were borrowing on their credit cards had liquid 
assets (cash, checking or savings accounts, or money-market mutual funds) greater than one 
month’s income.  Moreover, 69% of households borrowing on their credit cards had positive 
housing equity, against which they could borrow at lower cost than with credit cards.  This 
anomalous behavior is not due solely to low-income households.  In fact, among credit-card 
borrowing households with more than $50,000 of income during 1995 (equivalent to about 
$62,000 in 2004 inflation-adjusted dollars), 34% had more than one month’s income in liquid 
assets and 86% had positive home equity.  David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity 
Constraints and Interest Rates Matter For Consumer Behavior?  Evidence From Credit Card 
Data, 117 Q. J. ECON. 149, 178 (2002). 
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during the ten years ending Sept. 30, 2004—a period of generally falling 
interest rates and low unemployment rates.7  A high rate of bankruptcy filings 
suggests that a large segment of the population lacks adequate credit-
management skills.8 
Table 2 summarizes the percentage of the sampled households that owned 
or used specific financial products from among the categories of deposit, 
investment, retirement, and credit products.  As was the case in Table 1, it is 
apparent in Table 2 that households are more actively engaged in cash and 
credit management while being less actively engaged in investment and 
retirement decisions.  As before, households’ use of credit products is difficult 
to interpret without further information.  More than 70% of households have a 
credit card and a mortgage, but are these credit instruments being used wisely?  
As discussed previously, we have reasons to believe many households do not 
use credit cards wisely.  As we will discuss later, a poor understanding of the 
costs and risks of mortgage debt also may inform households’ mortgage 
borrowing decisions. 
In sum, U.S. households’ average level of basic financial literacy is 
moderate at best.  Cash management is done reasonably well by most 
households, while long-term investment decision-making—including 
retirement planning—is done poorly by the average household (in some cases 
by doing nothing at all).  Credit-management skills lie somewhere in-between 
cash-management and investment-planning abilities.  Most U.S. households 
are active users of mortgage credit and other forms of credit.9  There are 
reasons to believe many households’ credit decisions could be improved, as the 
rest of the paper discusses. 
II.  ADVANCED CONSUMER-FINANCE CONCEPTS 
A review of recent consumer-finance surveys indicates that basic financial 
literacy is only moderate in the average U.S. household.10  Some subtle and 
complex financial concepts are widely misunderstood by many people.  A 
clear example from the survey discussed in the previous section is the lack of 
retirement planning by two thirds of the population (Table 1).  Apparently it is 
 
 7. News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Down in 
Fiscal Year 2004 (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/ 
archive2004.html. 
 8. To put 13 million non-business bankruptcy filings in perspective, there were about 99 
million households in the U.S. in 1995, and there are about 112 million households today.  Thus, 
even if there were some repeat filers and multiple members of single households among the 13 
million, roughly one in ten U.S. households has filed for bankruptcy during the last decade. 
 9. Three-fourths of U.S. families surveyed had some debt outstanding.  Among families 
headed by someone between 35 and 44 years old, more than 85 percent have some debt.  
Aizcorbe, supra note 5, at 23. 
 10. See generally Braunstein, supra note 3; Hilgert, supra note 2. 
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difficult for many to appreciate how important early and consistent saving is 
for financial security in retirement, despite ample saving options, advice, and 
tax benefits for doing so. 
To set the stage for the discussion of some consumer-finance myths in the 
next section, I discuss three advanced consumer-finance concepts here: 1) 
interest rates, 2) the risks of borrowing, and 3) the housing decision. 
A. Real Interest Rates and Duration 
Two fundamentally important concepts in financial theory are real interest 
rates and duration.  The first draws a distinction between the stated, or 
nominal, rate of interest on a debt and the equivalent hypothetical rate of 
interest that would prevail if there were no inflation expected over the life of 
the obligation.  The concept of duration summarizes both the sensitivity of a 
fixed-income obligation’s fair value to changes in interest rates and, more 
importantly for our purposes, the amount of time until half of the debt has been 
repaid (i.e., the average maturity of repayments).  Duration takes into account 
the fact that interest and principal are paid at various points in time, not just at 
maturity, and that the level of interest rates affects the distribution of the 
repayment burden over time. 
1. Real Interest Rates 
The true cost of borrowing—the wealth you will give up later to obtain 
cash today—is best expressed as a real (after-inflation) interest rate.11  What is 
the cost of a 30-year fixed mortgage rate at 6%?  If the inflation rate is 
expected to be 6% annually during the period you hold the mortgage, the real 
interest rate, or cost of borrowing, is expected to be zero.  In this case, 
borrowing is essentially “free”—in terms of purchasing power, the total 
number of dollars you repay will buy no more than the dollars you borrowed.  
If inflation is expected to be about 2% annually (as is currently the situation), 
the real interest rate is expected to be 4%.  In this case, borrowing is relatively 
expensive because the lender will be able to buy 4% per year more goods and 
services with the dollars you repay than you can buy with the money you 
borrowed.12 
 
 11. The concepts of nominal and real interest rates are discussed in every basic finance 
textbook.  On-line information is also available.  See, e.g., Mike Moffat, What’s the Difference 
Between Nominal and Real?, at http://economics.about.com/cs/macrohelp/a/nominal_vs_real.htm 
(last visited April 18, 2005). 
 12. Although there were frequent periods of deflation in the U.S. lasting a year or more 
before the 1950s, there have been none since 1955.  During the last fifty years, annual inflation 
rates in the U.S. have been as high as 13.5% (1980) and as low as 1.0% (1961).  U.S. Dept. of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index: All Urban Consumers, available at 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (Mar. 23, 2005). 
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The mathematical relationship between nominal (actual) and real interest 
rates was summarized by Irving Fisher more than a century ago.13  The so-
called Fisher equation distinguishes between the dollars a debtor must repay 
and the purchasing power those dollars represent.  The Fisher equation is 
(except for a small rounding error): 
rr = nr – i, or 
Real interest rate = Nominal interest rate - Expected inflation rate. 
That is, one should subtract the loss of purchasing power expected due to 
inflation from the stated nominal rate paid on any debt to approximate the true 
economic cost of borrowing or, conversely, the economic gain from lending. 
The rationale for making an inflation adjustment to interest rates is based 
on the historical evidence that wages, prices, and incomes tend to rise or fall 
together over time in ways that are unrelated to the economic transactions 
people are willing (or unwilling) to enter.  That is, the “general price level” 
seems to move up and down over time, creating inflation or deflation.  
Suppose, for example, that the market value of your house doubles, but your 
income and the prices of all houses and everything else you buy also doubles.  
You are no better or worse off than before and you have no reason to engage in 
any transactions in response to the price changes.  The doubling of your house 
price reflects nothing but a doubling of the general price level, or inflation of 
100%. 
Another example more clearly related to the Fisher equation is a decline in 
mortgage rates—say, from 8% to 6%—that occurs when the expected inflation 
rate declines by the same two percentage points—from 4% to 2%.  The 
expected real interest rate was, and remains, 4%.  Nominal rates fell, but real 
rates remained the same—so should you change your financial behavior, for 
example, by refinancing your mortgage?  The answer to this question is 
complex and is the subject of later sections of the paper. 
2. Duration 
Understanding the idea of duration (if not its mathematical definition) is 
important because people may be fooled by one financial contract that appears 
identical to another except that their durations differ.  A recent illustration is 
presented by falling mortgage interest rates.  The important point is that, as a 
matter of mathematics, the duration of a mortgage (or any other fixed-rate debt 
instrument) increases as nominal interest rates decline. 
To illustrate the issue this creates, consider a simple example.  A two-year, 
8%, $100,000 mortgage with annual payments requires two equal payments of 
 
 13. See generally IRVING FISHER, APPRECIATION AND INTEREST in MATHEMATICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS IN THE THEORY OF VALUE AND PRICE & APPRECIATION AND INTEREST 
(Augustus M. Kelley 1961), 333-442 (1896). 
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$56,077 at the end of the first and second years.  A two-year, 6%, $100,000 
mortgage with annual payments requires equal payments of $54,543.50 at the 
end of the first and second years.  The first annual payment represents 52% of 
the 8% mortgage’s economic value, but only 51% of the 6% mortgage’s 
economic value. In other words, the lower interest rate reduces each (nominal) 
payment and allows the borrower to push some of the burden of repayment (in 
financial terms, the present discounted value) into the future.  That is, the 
duration of the 6% mortgage is greater than the duration of the 8% mortgage. 
The duration-increasing effects of declining interest rates are much larger 
with 30-year mortgages.  A household that replaces a 30-year, 8%, $100,000 
fixed-rate mortgage with a 30-year, 6%, $100,000 fixed-rate mortgage 
effectively has pushed the real burden of repaying the loan more than a year 
into the future, on average.  The 8% mortgage has a duration of 9.6 years, 
while the 6% mortgage has a duration of 10.8 years.  In other words, half of the 
8% mortgage (in economic terms) will be paid off after 9.6 years, but it will 
take 10.8 years to pay off half of the 6% mortgage.  The real amount of the two 
mortgages–$100,000–remains the same. 
Most borrowers probably do not realize that the duration of their debt 
increases as the interest rate declines and, if they did, would not object.  
However, failure to understand duration makes consumers vulnerable to 
marketing pitches for “cash-out refinancing” transactions that increase the 
household’s principal balance while keeping monthly payments the same or 
even lower than before.  A larger mortgage principal balance combined with a 
greater mortgage duration unambiguously increases a household’s 
vulnerability to future economic shocks that could result in future financial 
distress or even default. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of increasing duration on a mortgage 
borrower.  The example is for a moderate-income homeowner who begins with 
a 30-year, 8% mortgage for $100,000.  The fraction of the borrower’s income 
available to pay the mortgage (after taxes and other living expenses) in the first 
year is assumed to be 88%.  As the borrower’s income increases with inflation 
of 4% per year, the burden of repaying the fixed-rate mortgage declines.  The 
declining burden is shown by the dashed line in Figure 1.  This borrower is 
expected to retire after twenty-five years, at which time her available income 
falls by half.  Because inflation has pushed up her income over time, the 
burden of repaying the mortgage in retirement is manageable—only 66% of 
her available retirement income is needed to cover mortgage payments during 
year twenty-six.  The downward slope of the repayment-burden schedule is 
known as the “tilt” of the mortgage. 
The solid line in Figure 1 illustrates the effect of a once-and-forever 
decline in the inflation rate at the very beginning of this example from 4% to 
2%, resulting in a decline of the mortgage rate from 8% to 6%.  After 
refinancing, the homeowner’s new schedule of repayment burden is flatter than 
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before.  That is, the tilt has decreased and the duration has increased (because 
more of the burden has been shifted into the future).  The borrower faces a 
lower repayment burden in the early years (through year ten), but a greater 
repayment burden in the later years compared to the original mortgage.  The 
greatest stress over the lifetime of the mortgage now occurs during the 
borrower’s retirement, when the repayment burden peaks at about 88 percent 
of available income.  We return to this example in a later section of the paper. 
B. The Risks of Borrowing 
1. Secured vs. Unsecured Loans 
One crucial feature of a debt agreement is whether the borrower pledges 
any collateral to the lender.  That is, can the lender seize valuable property or 
other assets of the borrower if the debt is not repaid in full on time?  A 
mortgage is an example of a secured or collateralized loan, while a credit-card 
loan is an example of unsecured or uncollateralized debt.  From the lender’s 
perspective, a secured loan is less risky than an unsecured loan if the borrower 
has pledged valuable assets, such as a house.  It stands to reason, therefore, that 
the interest rate on a secured loan will be lower than the rate on an unsecured 
loan to the same borrower.  The difference in rates, therefore, reflects 
differences in risk.  There may be other factors that affect the spread between 
mortgage and credit-card loan rates, but risk differences are likely to be the 
most important. 
The borrower’s perspective is the opposite of the lender’s perspective.  To 
a borrower, an unsecured loan is less risky than a secured loan.  This is because 
a homeowner can lose her house if she defaults on a mortgage, while no 
collateral is at risk with a credit-card debt. 
2. Cash-out Refinancing 
Millions of Americans have refinanced mortgages in recent years.  In a 
refinancing, a homeowner takes out a new mortgage and uses the proceeds to 
pay off the old mortgage.  If the new mortgage is larger than the old mortgage, 
the difference goes to the borrower as cash.  In the example of Figure 1, the 
homeowner benefited immediately from lower required repayments on the new 
mortgage—albeit at the cost of a higher repayment burden later. 
Freddie Mac (a government-sponsored enterprise that supports the 
mortgage market) reported recently that 46% of all refinanced mortgages 
during 2004 were cash-out refinancings.  Freddie Mac estimates that, for 2004 
as a whole, the total amount of cash received by homeowners refinancing into 
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a larger principal balance was about $135 billion.14  In other words, the “new 
mortgages” amounted to $135 billion more than the “old mortgages” they 
replaced.  Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has discussed this trend 
toward “extraction” or “liquification” of home equity at the time of mortgage 
refinancing in several recent speeches.15 
In contrast to its recently popularized pseudonyms with favorable 
connotations—”cash-out refinancing” and “extraction” or “liquification” of 
home equity—the practice of taking on a new mortgage larger than the one it 
replaces is nothing more than additional borrowing.  The practice could just as 
accurately be termed “levering up” as “cashing out.”  Ironically, the cash-out 
refi boom has been portrayed as a revolutionary new financial technique—
monetary magic—when, in fact, it is simply a decision by a household to go 
deeper into debt. 
C. The Housing Decision 
1. Housing Wealth 
To an economist, the fundamental value of a financial asset is determined 
by the future cash flows it produces for its owner.  To determine the value of a 
bond or a stock, an economist specifies (for a bond) or estimates (for a stock) 
the cash flows it will generate in the future.  Each future cash flow then is 
“discounted” to reflect its riskiness and how far into the future it will occur.  
Riskier payments and those that will occur further in the future are discounted 
more because an investor prefers safe payments that occur soon.  The sum of 
all the expected discounted present values an asset will generate is its 
fundamental value. 
Expected capital gains or losses play no part in this asset-pricing 
framework because any future gain or loss on the sale of a stock or bond 
merely reflects differences of opinion between the buyer and the seller of what 
the asset’s future cash flows (or appropriate discount rate) will be.  Said 
another way, the seller’s capital gain or loss reflects nothing more than the 
buyer’s optimism or pessimism about the future of the asset.  The mere sale of 
an asset cannot generate economic value to the economy as a whole; rather, 
fundamental value is created by the cash flows of the asset itself. 
Determination of the fundamental value of a house is no different.  The 
benefits a house produces are what economists call “housing services,” 
 
 14. This is equivalent to about 1.5% of total household disposable income for 2004.  See 
Freddie Mac, Cash-Out Refi Report: 4Q 2004, at http://freddiemac.com/news/finance/docs/ 
annual_censusrefi.xls (last visited April 18, 2005). 
 15. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, Remarks at America’s Community Bankers Annual 
Convention, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20041019/ 
default.htm (Oct. 19, 2004). 
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typically measured as the rent that could be charged if the house were placed in 
the rental market.  Taxes, repairs, and maintenance costs should be subtracted 
from rental payments to arrive at a net yield.  The fundamental value of the 
house therefore is the sum of the present discounted value of all future rental 
payments after expenses. 
As with stocks and bonds, a capital gain or loss incurred by a household 
when it sells a house is meaningless from the perspective of the economy as a 
whole.  The mere fact of selling a house does not create any new housing 
services to rent out.  To be sure, rising house prices represent higher future 
rental payments—but this means only that renters will be paying more to their 
landlords for the same housing services.  Tenants lose every dollar that 
landlords gain, and vice versa.  For an owner-occupier, the rising value of 
one’s house is cancelled out by the higher rental payments she is foregoing by 
living in the house rather than renting it out.  For the economy as a whole, 
therefore, capital gains and losses on existing houses are, by definition, always 
exactly zero.16 
2. Renting vs. Buying 
Households may purchase housing services in two different ways—by 
renting a housing unit from someone else or by purchasing a housing unit for 
their own use.  In becoming an owner-occupier, a household effectively is a 
landlord renting a house to itself.  This characterization of the dual nature of 
homeownership is useful for three purposes—1) the government tracks these 
two distinct functions of owner-occupiers exactly this way for the purposes of 
economic statistics; 2) it clarifies the current tax treatment of owner-occupied 
housing; and 3) it helps shed light on the consumer-finance aspects of 
homeownership—including the consumer-finance myths discussed in the next 
section. 
The rent-vs.-buy decision is one of the most important and complicated 
financial decisions any household will make.  The rational determinants of this 
decision include: 
 The household’s wealth, income, and access to financing; 
 The availability of the desired type of housing unit for rent and/or 
purchase (including number of rooms, quality, amenities, location, 
etc.); 
 The expected length of time one expects to stay in this housing 
unit; 
 
 16. For an extended discussion of this point, see Do House Price Increases Add to Net 
Wealth, in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 75 OECD 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 133 (2004). 
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 Tax considerations, such as local property-tax rates and the 
household’s income-tax rate; and 
 Expectations about future increases in one’s income and housing 
prices and rents. 
Table 3 illustrates several relevant criteria for households facing the rent-
or-buy decision.  Each of these criteria should be interpreted under the 
assumption of “all other things being equal.”  The point of the illustration is to 
suggest that the rent-vs.-buy decision is multi-dimensional and does not always 
come out in favor of buying.  Some of the relevant criteria include: 
 A household with a steady income may be more suited to 
homeownership because it is better able to undertake the fixed 
financial commitment represented by a mortgage.  A household 
with highly variable income, on the other hand, may need to 
reduce housing expenses relatively rapidly if income declines 
precipitously.  For this household, the flexibility afforded by 
renting may be preferred. 
 A household with a large amount of wealth may be better suited 
for homeownership than a poor household because the 
idiosyncratic price risk of a house can be diversified within a 
portfolio of other assets, such as stocks and bonds. 
 A household that has well-defined preferences for a certain type of 
housing unit—for example, a strong preference for a single-family 
home in good condition with four bedrooms, a two-car garage, 
and a large yard—may be better served by owning because there 
may be few or no rental units available with the desired 
characteristics. 
 Because the transactions costs involved in selling a house and 
moving to a new residence are high—likely around 10% of the 
value of the house, including sales commissions, financing-related 
fees, and moving expenses—it is better for a household that 
expects to move within a short period of time to rent rather than 
own. 
 Households compete for housing units and, because there are tax 
preferences available to homeowners (both with and without 
mortgages), a household with a higher marginal tax rate will find a 
given house cheaper to own on an after-tax basis than another 
household with a lower tax rate, all else equal.  Some studies 
suggest that households in relatively low tax brackets (i.e., those 
facing marginal tax rates of less than 25% to 30%) may be better 
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off financially by renting rather than buying under most 
circumstances, holding other factors constant.17 
 Owning a house provides a hedge against unexpected future 
increases in the rental price of housing.  A household that has a 
low tolerance for bearing the risk of future “rent shocks” will 
benefit more from owning a house than a household that is more 
tolerant of such risk. 
III.  SEVEN CONSUMER-FINANCE MYTHS 
Armed with a better understanding of some complicated financial topics, it 
is possible to puncture several myths of consumer finance.  These myths (and 
others) persist both because it is not readily apparent to most consumers what 
the truth of the matter is, and because those who could destroy these myths 
face insufficient incentives to do so.  Financial-services providers benefit from 
financial illiteracy in some cases, while other knowledgeable and respected 
public figures often are focused on short-term imperatives that conflict with 
prudent long-run consumer behavior.18 
The seven consumer-finance myths discussed in this section are: 
1. “Interest rates have never been lower.” 
2. “All that matters is your monthly payment.” 
3. “Always pay off high-rate debt with lower-rate debt.” 
4. “Cash-out refinancing is a source of spendable income.” 
5. “Rising house prices make us all richer.” 
6. “All Americans’ dream is to own their own homes.” 
7. “All we need to do to solve the financial-illiteracy problem is dedicate 
more time/money/information/training, etc., etc.” 
A. Myth #1: “Interest rates have never been lower” 
It simply is not true that interest rates during the last few years are at their 
lowest level ever.  Thirty-year fixed mortgage rates and the yield on high-
quality corporate bonds (Aaa rated) have averaged slightly below 6% since the 
beginning of 2003.  To be sure, this is the first sub-six percent period for these 
 
 17. Edwin S. Mills, Housing Tenure Choice, 3 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 323, 329 (1990). 
 18. For example, Federal Reserve and other economic policymakers rarely admonish the 
public and businesses to borrow and spend less in order to save more.  This is because reduced 
borrowing and spending would slow the economy’s growth in the short run, even though it might 
improve long-term growth prospects. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
348 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:335 
long-term interest rates since 1967—making current yields the lowest in more 
than thirty-five years.19 
We don’t have reliable data on long-term mortgage yields much before the 
early 1960s, but corporate bonds issued by strong companies (Aaa or 
equivalent) carried yields below 6% continuously from 1800 through 1967.  In 
other words, when considering the 205-year span between 1800 and 2004, the 
anomalous episode was the thirty-five year period 1968-2002, when long-term 
yields were above 6%.  Between 1880 and 1960, corporate bond yields 
generally were below 4 percent (with the exception of the aftermath of World 
War I).20 
Moreover, the claim that current long-term rates are exceptionally low is 
not true, even during the last forty years, if we consider real (after-inflation) 
rates.  The average expected real 30-year mortgage rate during 1963-2003 was 
4.06%.21  If CPI inflation remains in the range of 2% to 2.5% (as the Federal 
Reserve intends), a 5.75% mortgage contracted today will represent about a 
3.5% real rate of interest—not far below the average real rate for the 1963-
2003 period.  Those fortunate enough to have borrowed when nominal 
mortgage rates briefly fell to 5.25% in June 2003 may experience about a 3% 
real rate.  However, most of the mortgage debt incurred during the last few 
years likely will turn out to bear real interest rates of 3% to 4%.  Higher 
inflation would result in lower realized real rates, and vice versa. 
The danger of this myth is that borrowers may believe the cost of 
borrowing is at “once-in-a-lifetime” low levels and therefore borrow large 
amounts of money they later regret.  If inflation remains relatively low, the true 
cost of mortgage borrowing today will turn out to be near its long-run average. 
B. Myth #2: “All that matters is your monthly payment” 
A typical context in which this consumer-finance myth might appear is a 
mortgage or auto-loan closing.  The smiling banker reassures the nervous 
 
 19. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield,  at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/AAA/119/Max (last visited April 18, 2005). 
 20. JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN 8 (3d ed. 2002). 
 21. Cf. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 30-Year Conventional Mortgage Rate, at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MORTG/114/Max (last visited April 18, 2005) 
(graphically demonstrating the 30-year conventional mortgage rate from 1970 to 2005); Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers: All Items, at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPIAUCNS/9/Max (last visited April 18, 2005) 
(graphically demonstrating the consumer price index from 1945 to 2005).  Expected real 
mortgage rates were calculated as the nominal mortgage rate during a given month minus the 
twenty-four month centered average annualized CPI inflation rate.  That is, expected inflation at 
any point in time is assumed to be the geometric average of last year’s and next year’s inflation 
rates.  This approach reflects the empirical fact that inflation expectations are slow-moving, so 
last year’s inflation is relevant; and that expectations about next year’s inflation rate may be 
approximately rational (unbiased). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] CONSUMER-FINANCE MYTHS 349 
borrower that, despite the staggering sum of total interest payments to which 
she is about to commit herself, there is really nothing to worry about.  “Can 
you make that monthly payment?” the lender asks, pointing to the amount on 
the contract.  Before waiting for her answer, he purrs, “Of course you can—
and that’s all you need to know.  Just sign right here.” 
Your monthly payment is not all you need to know about your loan, of 
course.  The effective annual rate you are paying, the fees, the term to 
maturity, myriad contract contingencies, and other details also matter a great 
deal. 
Another key characteristic of the loan that even the lender may not 
understand is its duration (see previous discussion for an explanation of 
duration).  Lower nominal interest rates produce a lower monthly payment, but 
they also increase the duration of the debt.  In other words, more of the real 
burden of repayment is pushed into the future.  It will take longer to pay off 
any given fraction of the loan than before, increasing the potential repayment 
stress later in the loan term. 
Figure 1 illustrates the duration-increasing effect of a decline in nominal 
interest rates that is due entirely to a decline in expected inflation.  The real 
interest rate remains the same.  The tilt (slope) of the schedule of repayments 
relative to available income declines (becomes less steep).  This means that 
earlier payments become less burdensome while later payments become more 
burdensome than under a contract with a higher inflation and interest rate.  Of 
course, the total amount to be repaid remains the same. 
The danger of this myth is that borrowers may not understand the trade-off 
they are accepting between less-burdensome early payments and more-
burdensome later payments.  The immediate attraction of a lower monthly 
payment may obscure the risk of later payments that remain larger in real terms 
because inflation has not eroded them as much as would be the case with 
higher inflation and interest rates. 
C. Myth # 3: “Always pay off high-rate debt with lower-rate debt” 
This strategy should save the borrower money in the short run, but it 
involves risks down the road.  This is because the lower-rate debt invariably 
requires the borrower to pledge some valuable collateral to secure the loan. 
An example of a high-interest rate loan is credit-card debt.  A mortgage is 
a lower-rate loan.  As discussed previously, the primary reason the loan rates 
differ is that the lender faces different exposures to loss.  The credit-card 
lender has no claim on the borrower’s collateral to mitigate losses, while the 
mortgage lender can take the borrower’s house.  Thus, a consumer who lowers 
her interest rate is probably giving a security interest to the lender in some of 
her assets.  For the borrower—especially a distressed one who may need to file 
for bankruptcy in the future—secured debt is riskier than unsecured. 
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The danger of this myth is that borrowers may not realize the trade-off they 
are accepting. The borrower pays a lower interest rate but puts some of her 
property at risk of foreclosure. 
D. Myth #4: “Cash-out refinancing is a source of spendable income” 
Cash-out refinancing is the strategy of paying off one mortgage by taking 
out a larger mortgage and then pocketing the difference in cash.  Described in 
these terms, it is clear that “cash-out refinancing” simply means increasing 
your debt.  Cash raised from borrowing is not income, even though the cash 
received from the transaction can be spent freely as if it were income. 
A recent financial column in the Washington Post describing the cash-out 
refinancing craze may illustrate the extent of the public’s misunderstanding of 
the process—even among intelligent observers of financial affairs such as 
financial journalists.22  The article mentions several times that a homeowner 
who carries out a cash-out refinancing transaction receives cash “tax-free.”  
But raising cash by borrowing is never taxed—so why should a debt increase 
in the context of a cash-out refinancing incur a tax liability?  Only income 
(from wages, dividends, interest, or capital gains) is taxed, while increasing 
debt is not a taxable event.  The article also uses phrases such as “tap rapidly 
accumulating home real estate wealth,” “convert . . . real-estate equity into 
spendable cash,”  “cash out . . . home equity,” “borrow money from your home 
piggy bank,” and “equity sitting frozen in your home.”  These images might 
convince a gullible reader that some sort of financial alchemy is being 
conjured out of bricks and mortar.  To be fair to the columnist, however, the 
risks to borrowers of increasing debt are mentioned—but only near the end of 
the article. 
Figure 2 illustrates an example of a cash-out mortgage refinancing.  As in 
the example illustrated in Figure 1, the expected inflation rate falls from 4% to 
2%, bringing mortgage rates down from 8% to 6%.  Real interest rates remain 
unchanged, but the duration of any mortgage increases.  It is the failure to 
appreciate this fact that can lead borrowers into risky situations they do not 
understand. 
The borrower chooses to increase her loan amount from $100,000 to 
$122,386, generating $22,386 of cash to be pocketed “tax-free.”  This new 
larger mortgage was chosen to maintain the borrower’s payment exactly as it 
was before the refinancing.  A borrower who believes that “all that matters is 
your monthly payment” will be tempted to think the $22,386 of cash she takes 
home from the mortgage closing is income of some sort (a capital gain, she 
may wonder?) or even “free money” conjured out of thin air. 
 
 22. Kenneth R. Harney, Cashing Out Equity May Be Tempting, But the Risk is High, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 4, 2004, at F1. 
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The truth is that the borrower faces a significantly increased burden of 
repayment over the life of the mortgage—as is wont to happen when 
increasing one’s debt.  The solid line in Figure 2 lies above the dashed line 
representing the burden of scheduled repayments of the original mortgage 
everywhere except at the very beginning.  In this example, the borrower’s new 
projected repayment burden peaks in retirement at more than 100% of her 
available income.  In other words, the cost of the $22,386 cash-out refinancing 
today is probable default later.  Thus, the cash-out refinancing craze clearly 
represents a danger to consumers—albeit one that very few borrowers or 
lenders likely understand. 
E. Myth #5: “Rising house prices make us all richer” 
Everyone knows someone who made a killing from selling a house that 
appreciated several-fold in value, or someone who has not sold but said: “The 
value of my house has gone up X thousand dollars in just the last three years!”  
Individual households’ actual and unrealized capital gains (and occasional 
capital losses) are so vivid to most of us that it is difficult to accept that, for the 
economy as whole, “housing wealth” does not exist. 
To see the myth of housing wealth most clearly, imagine a simple 
economy with exactly two homeowning households.  Suppose the “market 
value” of each of their houses was $200,000 yesterday.  Today, both 
households believe their houses have doubled in value.  One household sells its 
house to the other, pocketing a $200,000 capital gain—an apparent increase in 
the economy’s housing wealth.  But the first household needs somewhere to 
live, and the second household has an extra, empty dwelling.  So household 
one buys from household two—but at the inflated price of $400,000, 
generating a $200,000 capital gain for household two.  Neither household has 
any more cash or other assets than they had before, and they each own one 
house as before.  What has changed?  We can say the housing wealth of the 
economy has doubled, but it has no economic significance—it is a myth. 
To draw the obvious analogy to the real world, suppose every homeowner 
in the United States tried to sell his or her house to turn their imagined 
appreciated values into cash.  To whom would we all sell, and at what price?  
After selling, where would we live?  Even if we just bought each others’ 
houses at higher prices than we paid for them, our attempt to realize our 
supposed “housing wealth” would be frustrated by the fact that our gains on 
sale would be dissipated by the high prices we must pay to buy our neighbors’ 
houses. 
Another analogy may help illustrate the point.  Most consumers own cars, 
which are valuable, long-lasting assets.  Like a house, the value of a car is 
based on the services it will provide—in this case, transportation.  Do we feel 
richer when all automobile prices rise (for both new and used vehicles)?  
Probably not; in fact, many of us would feel poorer because we know we’ll 
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have to spend more to buy our next car.  Strictly speaking, the effect of rising 
car prices on those consumers who own cars should be nil, as in the case of 
owner-occupying households.  The increased market value of your car is 
cancelled out by the increasing cost of transportation services—either those 
you enjoy from your own car, or those you could obtain from an auto-rental 
company. 
The point is that the value of a house is derived solely from the housing 
services it provides (equivalently, the rent foregone).  A higher house price 
therefore represents a higher cost of future housing services.  A homeowner is 
hedged against changes in the cost of housing services by the corresponding 
change in the value of the house that provides them. 
To be sure, some people gain and others lose when house prices change.  
Who are the winners when house prices fluctuate?  Older, wealthier 
households in regions with higher incomes potentially benefit from rising 
house prices if they downsize or move out of their high-priced cities or regions 
entirely.  Losers include the younger, less wealthy households in lower-price 
cities or regions who might want to move into areas with higher housing 
prices. 
Why then do consumers appear to spend more when house prices are 
rising, as during recent years?  Isn’t this evidence for a housing wealth effect?  
Rising house prices increase the (risky) value of collateral a borrower has 
available to pledge to a lender.  A household that previously felt liquidity-
constrained may be able to borrow and spend more when the value of its 
collateral increases.  But being able to borrow more does not, by itself, make 
any of us richer. 
F. Myth #6: “All Americans’ dream is to own their own homes” 
A historically high homeownership rate often is trumpeted as an 
unambiguous sign of economic and social progress.  National housing policy 
(and mortgage lenders and homebuilders) seem to recognize no natural upper 
limit on the homeownership rate short of 100%. 
Yet homeownership is not appropriate for everyone.  Table 3 summarizes 
several relevant factors in a rational decision to buy or rent.  These include the 
level and volatility of the household’s income, a household’s wealth, a 
household’s need for specific kinds of housing units, the need or desire to 
move frequently, a household’s marginal income-tax rate, and the willingness 
of a household to bear the risk of unexpected future rent increases.  Potential 
housing bubbles in some parts of the U.S. today also reduce the attractiveness 
of homeownership for first-time buyers, as declining collateral values in the 
future could leave them over-indebted. 
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G. Myth #7: “All we need to do to solve the financial-illiteracy problem is 
dedicate more time/money/information/training, etc., etc.” 
The last consumer-finance myth affects scholars, regulators, policymakers, 
and consumer advocates as much as consumers themselves.  The problem of 
low financial literacy is likely to prove quite intractable, as the next section 
discusses. 
IV.  OBSTACLES TO WIDESPREAD FINANCIAL LITERACY 
Widespread financial literacy might be defined as something like 75% of 
the adult population being able to answer correctly 75% of the questions on a 
financial-literacy quiz.  The obstacles to achieving widespread financial 
literacy are threefold—inadequate basic skills, conflicts of interest for 
financial-services providers, and the increasing complexity of consumer 
finance itself. 
A. Basic Skills 
The first obstacle to widespread financial literacy is the underdevelopment 
in much of the U.S. adult population of the basic technical and emotional skills 
needed in financial decision-making.  In particular, math and economics 
training is poor in many elementary and secondary schools.  This matters 
because most financial decisions require consumers to make choices between 
subtly different quantitative alternatives.  At the same time, good financial 
management requires an armory of emotional skills—including self-discipline, 
resilience to occasional financial reversals, and the ability to resist the siren 
calls of friends, family members, and the prevailing consumer culture of 
instant gratification. 
Technical skills can be improved, at least in theory.  Decades have passed 
since we realized that we were a “nation at risk” from a deficient educational 
system, however; and it still is not clear that we have turned around the slow 
drift toward mediocrity in public education.  This is particularly true in 
technical subjects, in which U.S. secondary-school students consistently 
perform worse than students in other high-income countries.23  Improving 
emotional skills necessary for making good financial decisions probably is less 
amenable to formal education.  The strong dislike of deferred gratification 
(what economists call a “high personal discount rate”) so evident among so 
 
 23. For example, average scores for U.S. fifteen year olds placed them in a tie for  27th place 
out of thirty-nine countries in a recent Program for International Student Assessments (PISA) 
comparison of mathematics literacy.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
EDUCATION STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL OUTCOMES OF LEARNING IN MATHEMATICS 
LITERACY AND PROBLEM SOLVING: PISA 2003 RESULTS FROM THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE 14 
(2004), available at  http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005003.pdf (last visited April 18, 2005). 
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many people in the U.S., for example, may be deeply ingrained in our basic 
attitudes or culture.  It is unlikely those things can be changed quickly, if at all. 
B. Conflicts of Interest 
The second obstacle to widespread financial literacy is the U.S. financial-
services sector itself.  Most U.S. consumer-finance providers are permeated by 
an inherent conflict of interest with their clients.24  All financial-services 
providers claim they have their clients’ best financial interests at heart, but this 
clearly cannot be true for stockholder-owned banks, insurance companies, 
mutual-fund providers, investment brokers and advisors.  These firms exist, 
after all, to make a profit.25  These firms’ revenues are increased by charging 
higher fees and loan rates, paying lower deposit rates and investment returns, 
and by encouraging greater use of their services, whether warranted or not. 
Why do we allow profit-making financial-services firms to operate?  The 
two key assumptions justifying a for-profit retail financial-services sector in 
the U.S. are that: 
1. A competitive, profit-maximizing industry promotes efficiency; and 
2. The doctrine of caveat emptor (“let the buyer beware”) produces 
market discipline and provides a level playing field for competition to 
flourish. 
Recent events and the evidence summarized in this paper cast doubt on the 
validity of both assumptions.  The scandals uncovered by the bursting of the 
stock-market bubble and, more recently, by New York Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer, brought to light some of the seamier and less-competitive aspects of 
the business of financial services in the U.S.26  A common theme in the still-
 
 24. See generally INGO WALTER, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 
AMONG FINANCIAL SERVICES FIRMS (N.Y.U., Stern Sch. of Bus., Econ. Dept., Working Paper 
No. EC-03-24, 2003), available at http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/research.cfm?doc_id=1025 
(last visited April 18, 2005).  Examples of a conflict of interest between a financial-services 
provider and the client are financial planners and brokers who profit from sales commissions.  
The financial planner or broker earns the most when the client buys the highest-commission 
investments and if the client frequently moves money into new investments. 
 25. Financial-services providers that are mutually owned, such as credit unions, mutual 
savings banks and insurance companies, and other co-operative ventures, are different.  They 
exist to maximize the benefits to the users of the services, rather than the enterprise’s profitability.  
Government-provided financial services, such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and 
unemployment insurance, also are exempt from this critique.  In other countries, institutions such 
as postal savings banks are sometimes very important providers of retail financial services.Not-
for-profit financial-services providers are subject to other problems, but an inherent conflict of 
interest with their clients is not one of them. 
 26. Several financial-services conflicts of interest exposed by Attorney General Spitzer 
resulted in negotiated settlements by accused financial-services firms reaching into the hundreds 
of millions of dollars.  Spitzer’s investigations included: 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] CONSUMER-FINANCE MYTHS 355 
unfolding financial-services scandals of recent years has been the abuse of 
inside or privileged access or information to rip off a client.  We really should 
not be surprised by the scandals, because a business that is both profit-
maximizing and based on gathering and using valuable private information is a 
recipe for fundamental conflicts of interest with clients.  It is unrealistic to 
expect competition alone to eliminate all opportunities for a financial firm to 
choose its own financial interests over those of a client. 
Government regulation inevitably expands to counter the inherent 
shortcomings of competition in financial services; the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 is only the latest example of a trend toward greater financial regulation 
that has been ongoing for more than a century in the U.S.27  The irony of this 
dialectic between competition and regulation is that the increasing costs of 
regulation reduce the net efficiency gains of a free market in financial services.  
At some point, the net-of-regulation gains in efficiency from allowing profit-
maximizing competition may be no greater than the level that could have been 
achieved by a financial-services sector populated primarily by not-for-profit 
firms such as credit unions, mutually owned insurance companies, and some 
government-provided services (such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, 
and unemployment insurance). 
The second flawed assumption underlying our for-profit financial-services 
sector is that consumers can and do protect themselves against the conflicted, 
misleading, or fraudulent behavior, communication, and advice of financial-
services firms.  The first six consumer-finance myths in the previous section 
describe some of the difficulties even conscientious and intelligent consumers 
 
 Biased equity research to support investment-banking business (for example, see the $100 
million agreement reached with Merrill Lynch); Press Release, Office of New York State 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement 
to Reform Investment Practices, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/may/ 
may21a_02.html (May 21, 2002). 
 Undisclosed kick-backs when insurance brokers arranged large insurance purchases for 
clients (see the agreement by Marsh and MacLennan to make $850 million in restitution 
payments); Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Insurance 
Broker Agrees to Sweeping Reforms, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/ 
jan/marshsettlement_pr.pdf (Jan. 31, 2005). 
 Undisclosed “late trading” and other preferential fund access to favored mutual-fund 
clients (see Bank of America’s agreement to pay $375 million); Press Release, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Reaches Agreement in Principle to Settle 
Charges Against Bank of America For Market Timing and Late Trading, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-33.htm (Mar. 15, 2004). 
 27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).  For a detailed summary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 see American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Summary of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, at http://www.aicpa.org/info/sarbanes_oxley_summary.htm (last visited April 18, 2005). 
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encounter when making financial decisions.  Many consumers probably do not 
know where to turn for help and may naively assume that a financial-services 
provider is an impartial source of advice (“Like a good neighbor . . . ,” “You’re 
in good hands with . . . ,” etc.). 
A perfect example of consumer naiveté, and hence vulnerability, is 
financial-services firms’ efforts to improve consumers’ financial literacy.  A 
2002 survey by the Consumer Bankers Association found that 96% of retail 
banks contributed to financial-literacy efforts in some way.28  Banks may 
believe this “helping hand” can improve their image with consumers, bringing 
in more business.  Moreover, federal bank regulators look favorably on 
financial-literacy efforts when evaluating banks for compliance with the 
Community Reinvestment Act.29 
But would consumers not be better off if financial-services providers 
reduced fees and loan rates rather than spending on financial-literacy efforts 
that, by all accounts, have minimal impact?  The point is, of course, that profit-
maximizing financial-services providers really do not want to “give back” any 
of their profit margin.  Nor do they necessarily desire more financially savvy 
customers who might shop around more actively or bargain down the terms on 
the products and services they sell. 
C. Increasing Complexity of Consumer Finance 
The third obstacle to widespread financial literacy is the undeniable fact 
that the literacy bar keeps rising—that is, the typical household’s 
responsibilities for managing its financial affairs are increasing.  Moreover, the 
tasks are becoming more and more complex. 
Two potentially far-reaching examples of increasing demands on 
consumers to make complex financial decisions are “personal retirement 
accounts” and “health savings accounts.”  These accounts constitute two key 
parts of President Bush’s agenda to increase households’ “ownership” and 
“responsibility” for their own financial well-being.30  Private accounts in 
Social Security would shift more responsibility for difficult decisions on to 
consumers.  In addition, a shift toward private accounts may reduce the 
progressivity of Social Security—that is, it could reduce the extent of income 
redistribution that currently exists in the benefit formulas. 
 
 28. CONSUMER BANKERS ASSOCIATION, FINANCIAL LITERACY PROGRAMS: A SURVEY OF 
THE BANKING INDUSTRY (2001), available at http://www.cbanet.org/Issues/Financial_Literacy/ 
documents/2002%20Survey%20Overview.pdf (last visited April 18, 2005). 
 29. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (1977).  For a brief 
overview of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, see The Federal Reserve Board, 
Community Reinvestment Act, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/cra/ (last visited April 18, 
2005). 
 30. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 127-30 (2005), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2005/2005_erp.pdf (last visited April 18, 2005). 
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Other examples of increasing financial responsibility include a private-
sector shift toward managed health care (health-maintenance organizations, or 
HMOs) and defined-contribution pension plans (401(k) type plans).31  The 
increasing cost and complexity of the healthcare system has encouraged 
employers that provide healthcare benefits to seek cost savings in the form of 
managed care.  The fact that people are living longer than ever before increases 
the need for retirement saving and planning outside of Social Security. 
V.  SUMMARY 
Consumer finance is becoming more complex every day.  The average 
level of U.S. households’ financial literacy is low.  Financial decisions are, by 
their very nature, complex.  Many important consumer-finance myths exist—
indeed, some of them are perpetuated actively by financial-services providers 
and the (largely unwitting) media. 
More time, money, information and training initiatives may reduce the 
number of poor consumer-finance decisions that are made.  However, the 
problem of financial illiteracy is not likely to disappear.  Several obstacles to 
achieving widespread financial literacy exist.  In some cases, they are growing 
larger.  Not least among the obstacles is the inherent conflict of interest that 
exists between profit-maximizing financial-services providers and their 
financially naïve customers.  Consumer-protection regulation is necessary, but 
it cannot banish all of the consumer-finance myths to which even conscientious 
and educated households sometimes fall victim. 
 
 31. IBM is one large employer that maintains a website for employees to learn about and 
discuss changing pension, retirement, and other benefits issues.  See IMB Employee News and 
Links, at http://www.ibmemployee.com/Highlights041106.shtml (last visited April 18, 2005). 
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Table 1.  Indicators of Basic Financial Literacy 
 
 
Consumer-Finance Categories 
 Specific financial behaviors 
Percentage of 
consumers who 
engage in this 
financial behavior 
(as of Dec. 2001) 
Cash-flow management  
 Pay all bills on time 88 
 Have a recordkeeping system 65 
 Balance checkbook monthly 67 
 Track expenses 59 
 Use a spending plan or budget 46 
Savings  
 Have an emergency fund 63 
 Save or invest money out of each paycheck 49 
 Save for long-term goals such as education, car, home, 
or vacation 
39 
 Plan and set goals for financial future 36 
Investment  
 Have money in more than one type of investment 53 
 Calculated net worth in past two years 40 
 Participate in employer’s 401(k) retirement plan 37 
 Put money into other retirement plan, such as an IRA 22 
Credit  
 Review credit report 58 
 Pay credit card balances in full each month 49 
 Compare offers before applying for a credit card 35 
Other  
 Do own taxes 40 
 Read about personal money management 20 
  
Memo: Average number of financial behaviors demonstrated 
by a household (out of 18 behaviors investigated) 
9 
 
Sources: Sandra Braunstein & Carolyn Welch, Financial Literacy: An Overview of 
Practice, Research, and Policy, 88 Fed. Res. Bull. 445 (2002); Marianne A. 
Hilgert et al., Household Financial Management: The Connection between 
Knowledge and Behavior, 89 Fed. Res. Bull. 309 (2003). 
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Table 2.  Use of Basic Consumer-Finance Products 
 
 
Consumer-Finance Product Types 
 Specific financial product 
Percentage of 
consumers who use 
this financial 
product (as of Dec. 
2001) 
Deposit products  
 Checking account 89 
 Savings account 80 
 Certificate of deposit 30 
Investment products  
 Any investment account 52 
 Mutual fund 46 
 Public stock 24 
 Bonds 6 
Retirement products  
 Company pension plan or 401(k) plan 45 
 IRA or Keogh 43 
Credit products  
 Credit card 79 
 Mortgage 72 
 Refinanced mortgage or loan for home improvements 35 
  
Memo: Average number of financial products owned by a 
household (out of 12) 
7 
 
Sources: Sandra Braunstein & Carolyn Welch, Financial Literacy: An Overview of 
Practice, Research, and Policy, 88 Fed. Res. Bull. 445 (2002); Marianne A. 
Hilgert et al., Household Financial Management: The Connection between 
Knowledge and Behavior, 89 Fed. Res. Bull. 309 (2003). 
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Table 3.  Who Should Buy a House and Who Should Rent? 
 
 
Criterion 
 Household characteristics 
 
 
Optimal housing-
tenure choice is 
more likely to be: 
Income  
 Steady over time Own 
 Variable from year to year Rent 
  
Wealth  
 High Own 
 Low Rent 
  
Specificity of housing needs  
 High Own 
 Low Rent 
  
Expected duration of stay in housing unit  
 More than 5 years Own 
 Fewer than 5 years Rent 
  
Marginal tax rate  
 25 percent or above Own 
 Below 25 percent Rent 
  
Willingness to bear the risk of unexpected future rent 
increases 
 
 Low Own 
 High Rent 
 
Note: These recommendations are for purposes of illustration only and are not 
based on a quantitative analysis of any household’s actual circumstances. 
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Figure 1.  Annual Repayment Burden After Refinancing $100,000 
Mortgage from 8 Percent to 6 Percent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assumptions: 
 Expected inflation rate falls from 4 percent to 2 percent. 
 Original mortgage is for $100,000 at 8 percent for 30 years, with annual 
level repayments. 
 Mortgage after refinancing is for $100,000 at 6 percent for 30 years, with 
annual level repayments. 
 Available income begins at $10,000 in year 1, increasing by 4 percent 
annually through year 25 in the original scenario. 
 Available income begins at $10,000 in year 1, increasing by 2 percent 
annually through year 25 in the second scenario (after refinancing). 
 Available income falls by half at retirement beginning in year 26, then 
increases at the same rate as before retirement. 
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Figure 2.  Annual Repayment Burden After Refinancing $100,000 Mortgage from 
8 Percent to 6 Percent, Increasing the Principal Balance to $122, 386 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assumptions: 
 Expected inflation rate falls from 4 percent to 2 percent. 
 Original mortgage is for $100,000 at 8 percent for 30 years, with annual 
level repayments. 
 Mortgage after refinancing is for $122,386 at 6 percent for 30 years, with 
annual level repayments. 
 Available income begins at $10,000 in year 1, increasing by 4 percent 
annually through year 25 in the original scenario. 
 Available income begins at $10,000 in year 1, increasing by 2 percent 
annually through year 25 in the second scenario (after refinancing). 
 Available income falls by half at retirement beginning in year 26, then 
increases at the same rate as before retirement. 
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